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Defense community leaders have spearheaded an effort to 
transform and elevate military capability around 
information superiority. This means improving decisions 
and outcomes by making US and coalition forces better 
informed, more coordinated, faster and more adaptive. Our 
research focuses on how to architect communications so 
these goals are reached. We find that the “smart pull” 
approach described in Global Information Grid (GIG) 
technical guidance can’t meet these goals. The principal 
weaknesses stem from the stateless approach that can’t 
make good use of the operator’s context and dynamic 
information requirements. A better approach must exploit 
dynamic context and operator requirements to assure that 
high-value information flows quickly where it’s needed 
(VIRT) and is processed promptly by recipients. Initial 
studies have shown that this approach reduces the volume 
of bits by several orders of magnitude. It also raises the 
productivity of every operator enormously by assuring 
each can give immediate attention to truly valued 
information. Because the GIG, NCES, FORCEnet and 
related initiatives promise to cost billions of dollars and 
span a decade or more, we believe a change in direction is 
required to attain the goals of information superiority. 
Model-based communication networks and VIRT are 
essential pillars of an effective approach. 
 
WHAT & HOW OF INFORMATION SUPERIORITY 
 
This paper addresses the question of whether we can 
implement information superiority. That is, can we make 
our military operators superior to all competitors and 
against all challenges by providing them better 
information? What information would that be? What kind 
of process would deliver that information? What kind of 
process would cause the operators to act promptly on the 
best information? How would we avoid likely pitfalls, 
such as glutting operators with extraneous bits and assure 
they spent their time mostly acting upon important and 
timely ones? These basic questions weren’t addressed 
adequately in the early formulations.  
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VADM Cebrowski was an early proponent of network-
centric approaches to warfare and operations other than 
war. His concepts are embraced in DoD visions for using 
information superiority as a foundation for better, faster, 
more effective military operations. The “bible” for these 
concepts is the insightful book by Alberts, Gartska and 
Stein [1]. As an introduction to this paper, I’d like to give a 
highly simplified description of what information 
superiority is and how such leaders suggest it will be 
achieved (cf [2]). Responsibility for implementation of 
these ideas has, of course, passed from the seminal 
thinkers to such organizations as OSD’s NII, the Navy’s 
FORCEnet, and DISA’s GIG/NCES groups. While people 
may differ on details, the basic ideas follow: 
 
Networking makes it possible to communicate quickly, 
across great distances, and among diverse services 
and agencies. Thus, it should be possible for 
everybody to access all relevant information, 
regardless of who produced it or where. 
 
Information superiority would then result from each 
operator finding and accessing all information 
relevant to the mission. To expedite this process, each 
supplier should provide meta-data describing the 
contents and qualities of the data supplied. 
 
Bringing this down to a technical implementation level, all 
data would be marked up with some XML tags reflecting a 
supplier’s categories for content and quality. An operator 
seeking information would describe the data properties 
desired. A network query would search for matching meta-
data and then retrieve the data responsive to the operator’s 
query. Thus, the network would deliver all relevant data, 
with minimal delay, overcoming traditional barriers to 
effective information sharing.   
 
Several additional qualities would emerge from this 
effective dissemination of data. All participants in an 
operation could share a common operational picture, 
assuring that all would sense and respond to the same 
perceived reality. Because they could all “sing from 
the same sheet of music,” they could self-synchronize, 
enabling higher levels of autonomy and agility. 
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So the catechism goes more or less like this: What is 
information superiority? A state where each operator 
acquires all relevant information in a timely way. How is 
information superiority achieved? Enabling each operator 
to access quickly all relevant information leads directly to 
shared awareness, better decisions, and greater agility. 
 
Unfortunately, we find much of this argument naïve and 
likely harmful. As a high-level motivational concept, it has 
served its purpose well. As a guide to implementation, it’s 
seriously misguided. The purpose of this paper is to show 
why that is the case and how to achieve orders of 
magnitude better communication with much higher 
operator productivity. Such improvements, in turn, should 
lead to much higher operational effectiveness. In the next 
sections we revisit the basic tenets of information 
superiority, diagnose the naïve and dangerous 
misconceptions, and then proceed to remedy the problems.  
  
SHARED AWARENESS & RAPID DECISIONS 
 
One aim of information superiority is to support a shared 
and common situational awareness among collaborating 
forces. The Star Trek creature, the Borg, in some ways 
represents the ideal here: every member of the Borg 
participates in a common distributed cognition. When the 
Borg assimilates new units, they too become part of the 
group mind. In command-control parlance, all entities read 
and write from one Common Operational Picture (COP). 
 
Recently, people have begun to realize some of the 
fundamental reasons why such an ideal is not attainable. 
First, events occurring continuously at great distances 
can’t be instantaneously communicated. Second, all events 
are sensed and interpreted by various systems and people, 
and these interpretations are rarely 100% certain and 
accurate. Further, different perspectives produce multiple 
alternative interpretations. These can’t be instantly 
communicated, compared or resolved. Third, because the 
consumers of information are action oriented, each has 
customized needs based on their own context, concerns, 
and area of interest. At different levels of echelon, with 
different spatiotemporal spans of concern, decision makers 
literally need different types of information, reflecting 
appropriate levels of abstraction and aggregation. No 
single encoding of information can address these disparate 
needs.[3] So people now realize each operator needs a 
tailored, i.e. User Defined, operating picture (UDOP).    
 
Current efforts don’t yet address all of these concerns in a 
credible way. Efforts to build a COP and display to each 
operator an appropriate UDOP don’t yet squarely face the 
problems of uncertainty, alternative interpretations, 
latency, or the need for different levels of representation.  
There’s a tacit belief that these problems are marginal and 
that the best overall approach is to move, fuse, and 
disseminate as much information as possible. Following 
this logic, if we make the best information available, good 
things will follow. Specifically, when each person has 
timely access to all relevant operational information, rapid 
and effective decision-making will ensue. As an important 
side-effect of such optimal decision-making, operators will 
self-synchronize by referring to their shared COP. 
 
I find this idealized concept implausible, because it doesn’t 
address the fundamental limitations. Further, having 
studied decision-making in small and large organizations, 
in normal times and in crises, I think we must address 
these limitations to improve human performance. 
Specifically, we need to appreciate that humans are 
operating at finite information processing speeds, far 
below those required to achieve Borg-like total shared 
awareness. Moreover, because available information is 
rarely valuable for operators, it’s foolish to focus on 
making them process it all. We ought to ask how we can 
assure they apply their scarce mental resources to high-
value information. Two concepts that underlie the answer 
are MCNs and VIRT, the subjects of the next two sections. 
 
MODEL-BASED COMMUNICATION NETWORKS  
 
If we can’t possibly achieve Borg-like perfect distributed 
shared awareness because of fundamental limitations, what 
practically should be our objective? We should try to 
achieve three principal goals: 
1. Each operator should expend most of his or her 
resources maintaining the best description of 
situational variables that are most important. 
2. Each operator should provide information to 
others that they would most value. 
3. Communications should be optimized to maximize 
receipt and use of timely valuable information, as 
well as filtering out valueless information. 
 
These capabilities require that communication become 
sensitive to the dynamic context of the receiver, because 
the receiving operator’s current plans and beliefs 
determine what new data would be worth transmitting. 
When many operators work in the same environment, the 
potential to connect them with a network initially seems 
appealing. Naïvely, it seems attractive to have all data be 
disseminated to every interested party. There are many 
different network architectures for achieving this, but they 
all focus on moving all bits rapidly to interested parties.  
 
When communication systems strive to continually update 
many receivers with dynamic situation data, the demands 
on bandwidth and processing can be enormous. Because 
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each sensor or reconnaissance asset sends a steady stream 
of updates, every planner and operator finds a steady set of 
messages in the inbox needing attention. In real 
organizations, this produces a familiar sense of 
information glut [4] and operators regularly fall behind. 
Backlogs of hours or days of “real-time” data are common. 
 
We can improve the efficiency of communication 
resources by recognizing that receivers have different 
purposes and beliefs. What operators want communicated 
to them is evidence that can affect those purposes or 
should alter those beliefs. For example, a pilot who has a 
planned route would want to know about dangerous 
weather en route or newly detected enemy anti-aircraft 
capabilities threatening that route. Once new evidence has 
been conveyed, repetitions add no value. Evidence about 
irrelevant regions of space and time also lacks value. 
 
Good communicators need to understand the dynamic 
context or “state” of the recipient. This state includes the 
recipient’s mission, assumptions, and beliefs. When the 
sender understands this state and uses it to determine what 
to convey, communication is called “state-full” [5] 
 
Most operations of interest to us involve dynamic entities 
moving through time and space. We often model these 
entities mentally, as when we dead-reckon an inferred 
position of a vehicle based on its previous reported 
location and velocity. When multiple parties are operating 
in a distributed arena, they often wish to create and 
maintain a shared understanding of the “state” of enemy 
and friendly elements in that space. This gives an 
additional significance to state-full communication. If the 
beliefs of each party about such dynamic entities are 
reflected in dynamic models, each party should be able to 
update its overall situation autonomously by dead-
reckoning the component models. Air traffic controllers, 
for example, maintain “the bubble” in their head: they 
continually project flight paths of all aircraft from current 
data into the future to assure no conflicts will arise.  
 
A Model-based Communication Network (MCN) is a 
state-full distributed system of collaborating nodes that 
maintains an optimal shared understanding of the situation 
[6]. The situation at each node is composed of models of 
all entities relevant to its mission. Each node can 
dynamically project future states of such modeled entities. 
Each node, in addition, understands the state of its 
collaborating nodes, including the others’ missions, 
assumptions, and beliefs that might be affected by changes 
in its own perception of the situation. Thus, node A is 
aware of what node B is trying to do and how node A’s 
own knowledge might impact B’s beliefs and behavior. 
 
In principle, each node can determine what it knows that 
another node would want to know. That defines “valued 
information.” In an MCN, we give priority to conveyance 
of valued information. We also try to eliminate 
transmissions of low-value information, because that 
consumes valuable resources and increases latencies. 
While the principle of MCN is easily stated, turning it into 
operational practice is the goal of VIRT, addressed next. 
 
VALUED INFORMATION AT THE RIGHT TIME 
 
Although we can’t know perfectly what every operator 
wants to know, military practice has developed standard 
procedures that we can build on. For example, 
commanders often dictate to their staffs their critical 
information requirements (CCIRs). Commanders consider 
these conditions significant enough to wake them in the 
night, for example. Similarly, every operation that results 
from deliberate planning needs to know when assumptions 
underlying the plan no longer seem credible. A planned 
low-altitude flight, for example, can’t go if weather 
forecasts now predict surprising sand storms or 
thunderstorms. This basic idea is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. A simplified architecture for VIRT. 
The architecture in Figure 1 simplifies much of the 
complexity by focusing on just a single plan, apparently 
planned and periodically adjusted by only the one person 
illustrated. Of course, in real organizations many teams 
pursue many objectives, so there are many planners and 
plans extant at any point in time. Nevertheless, the key 
elements of the VIRT approach appear in this simple view. 
 
The overall flow in Figure 1 starts on the left side, where a 
plan has been generated. Each plan describes time-phased 
actions that should accomplish the plan’s objectives. The 
planner considered what the state of the world would be at 
the time the plan executes, and his/her beliefs about that 
future state correspond to the “assumptions” recorded in 
the plan. When planners select a plan, they usually 
evaluate it and compare its costs and benefits to other 
alternatives. They can record their reasons for selecting 
one particular alternative in the form of a justification. A 
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justification usually explains how the plan accomplishes 
the objectives in a situation where the assumptions validly 
hold and, also, why the planners prefer the selected plan to 
the alternatives considered. The justification often reflects 
that all of the alternatives considered had excessive risks 
or costs in comparison to the chosen one. 
 
Let’s consider a simple example. The planners might have 
an objective to rescue a small group of people on the 
ground in forested terrain. Their basic choices consist of 
reaching the people by ground or air and extricating them 
by ground or air. The likely options for ground transport 
include wheeled and tracked vehicles, horses, and humans. 
The likely options for air transport include rotorcraft v. 
fixed wing aircraft. Given a number of factors, they 
quickly reject all but the following skeletal plan:  
1. Survey the area by fixed wing aircraft to find the best 
landing spot for a helicopter.  
2. Send a helicopter with a search and rescue (SAR) 
team. 
3. Land the helicopter at the chosen site.  
4. Find and recover the party using the SAR team. 
5. Depart by helicopter and return the party to a chosen 
medical facility.  
Given this skeletal plan, the planners then focus on 
possible aircraft and routes, total expected flight times and 
associated fuel requirements, and possible time sequences 
for the flights. The flights become highly dependent upon 
the assumed wind, visibility, and icing conditions en route 
and at the search and rescue area.  
 
Let’s complete the example plan. The planners assume that 
a 90-minute aerial survey will be required to choose the 
best landing site. They choose an available low-altitude 
aircraft that carries appropriate instruments and can reach 
the site in a two-hour flight. The aircraft has 6.5 hours of 
fuel, adequate for two 2-hour legs and a 1.5 hour survey, 
and still leaves a 1-hour mandatory reserve.  Winds in the 
area are forecast to be excessive between the hours of 1300 
and 1800 local, and adequate sunlight is expected only 
from 1000 to 1900. For these reasons the flight is planned 
for early tomorrow morning, so that the survey begins 
promptly at 1000. Thus, take-off is scheduled for 0800. 
The helicopter is scheduled for a 3-hour flight to the search 
area, and is planned to depart at 0900, so that it can receive 
landing coordinates at 1130 from the SAR aircraft survey 
team 30 minutes prior to touching down.  
 
Even this example leaves out countless details, but it 
provides enough to illustrate the key VIRT architecture 
features. The VIRT dependency monitor watches for 
changes in forecast or actual conditions that threaten the 
plan by undercutting its justification. In the current case, 
the monitor needs to revalidate periodically the key 
assumptions regarding aircraft availability, aircraft 
capabilities, winds, visibility, icing and fuel consumption. 
 
My USMC colleagues at NPS, under the leadership of 
LtCol Carl Oros [7], have shown how VIRT can be 
implemented in many standard operations. Basically, we 
begin by identifying assumed conditions that each phase of 
the operation depends on, such as healthy troops, effective 
weapons, suitable communications, and credible target 
location and identification. Each such assumption is 
negated to define a condition of interest (COI), a type of 
worrisome event that warrants immediate notification. The 
information network is tasked to monitor these COIs and 
to alert the operator immediately when one is detected. 
 
To implement VIRT, we need a vocabulary of terms, such 
as “location of target,” “accuracy of location estimate,” 
“weapons status,” “communications capability,” and 
“troop health status.” These variables are associated with 
specific operations and units, and they may be indexed by 
space and time, because many of them are dynamic. A 
COI is then written as a kind of expression or “continuous 
query” that probes current information sources for a 
change from “non-event” to “event.” For example, when 
communications capabilities fail, that’s a change of data 
value from uninteresting to important, because the COI 
just becomes true. 
 
VIRT works by allowing operators to express their COIs 
in an easy-to-use language of expressions built upon their 
own vocabulary. COIs are monitored by brokers or agents 
that perform continuous queries on relevant data. Data 
processing can be pushed further upstream, close to 
relevant sensors, to optimize computation, minimize delay, 
and minimize bit flow. 
 
In the end, each operator can delegate to a system with 
VIRT capabilities responsibility for monitoring all known 
COIs. This reduces the operator’s workload by offloading 
routine monitoring of predictable problems. It reduces the 
flow of information to the operator. It frees up the 
operator’s attention to deal promptly with alerts. It also 
makes more operator time available to consider novel or 
unpredictable situations that may arise.  For an existing 
successful example of this approach consider ships’ 
electronic navigation systems.  A navigator, based on his 
captain’s intent, informs the system of intended route, 
required safety margins, fuel consumption constraints, etc.  
The ship’s fathometer, radars, GPS receiver, compass, and 
engineering plant all monitor COIs and deliver an alarm 
when the navigator’s expectations are no longer true. A 
watch officer then intervenes appropriately.  Merchant 
ships have exploited this superior information value chain 
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by drastically reducing manning on their bridges. The next 
section explains why VIRT improvements are much more 
than just incremental. In fact, they are extraordinary. 
 
ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE ADVANTAGE 
 
Over the last two decades, huge improvements in 
manufacturing effectiveness were achieved through a 
combination of “just-in-time” deliveries and other “supply 
chain integration” techniques. The key behind these 
improvements was to make each process step as efficient 
as possible and to minimize idle resources. Optimal results 
could be achieved if expensive processors and people were 
always busy on high-value products and unfinished 
products moved smartly from processor to processor, 
eliminating idle time and inventory. 
 
It’s helpful to look at business and military decision-
making systems as “information chain” integration tasks, 
analogous to supply chain integration. In information 
chains, we are moving bits rather than molecules, but we 
still have scarce and expensive resources that shouldn’t be 
wasted. In most military operations, our scarcest resources 
are time for decision making and communications 
bandwidth among mobile entities. We don’t want to waste 
these resources by moving low-value bits or by creating 
backlogs of unprocessed bits awaiting analysis. In military 
contexts the penalties for delay are worse, because the bits 
are “perishable.” Like fresh fruit, information is best 
consumed when ripe, before becoming stale. Furthermore, 
in military contexts poorly informed decisions can cost 
lives. Thus, the rewards for efficient information chains 
will be even greater than for efficient supply chains. 
 
In a recent paper[8], I evaluated the quantitative advantage 
of a VIRT approach (“smart push”) for information 
dissemination and compared it to the best possible version 
of “smart pull,” where operators retrieve information from 
the GIG relevant to their missions. The scenario involved a 
helicopter pilot flying a mission in hostile territory (akin to 
that in [7]). Denning [4] paraphrased my analysis, and I 
reuse some of his pithy version in the paragraphs below. 
 
Before starting, the pilot creates a flight plan that avoids 
storm cells and air defense positions. The pilot will deviate 
only on learning of changes in storm and defense 
positions, as well as movements of other aircraft, that 
intersect the flight path. Various other technologies 
(weather observation, radar) track storm movements, anti-
aircraft positions, and other aircraft through the entire 
region. Of all these data, however, the pilot will only value 
those that stimulate the pilot to consider promptly a 
deviation from the current route.  
 
Consider a flight path through a region 200km on a side. 
Sensor resolution in the region is 1 km, giving 40,000 grid 
points. Vertically, data are available at 500m intervals 
from altitude 0 to 6 km, a total of 13 altitude coordinates. 
That gives 520K grid points in the 3-D volume. Forecasts 
of ten variables are tracked at each grid point, giving 5.2M 
data values in the volume. Weather forecasts are updated 
every 30 min., and the flight is scheduled for 4.5 hours, 
giving 10 update times. Thus the total size of the data 
space is approximately 52M values.  
 
In a “dumb” push environment, the sensors and updaters 
send new information to the pilot whenever they get it, so 
during the 4.5 hr flight, the pilot receives all 52M values. 
If we instantiate a “smart pull” as described for example 
by Mr Krieger on behalf of ASD NII [9], the pilot uses 
tools to search the data for items more obviously relevant 
to his interests. For example, he might discard data more 
than 5 km away from the flight path or set local filters to 
hide data that have changed less than 5% since their 
previous reading. Even if such filters remove 99% of the 
received values, the remaining 1% (520K potentially 
relevant values) will exceed the pilot’s capacity to make 
sense of them and constitute a likely distraction. Worse, 
the 99% of values discarded wasted scarce bandwidth and 
probably slowed deliveries to other warfighters.   
 
In a smart push environment, the pilot describes COIs so 
that data outside some radius of the planned flight path are 
irrelevant and alerts are received only when variables 
deviate enough from prior values to warrant considering a 
change in route. A VIRT data server receives these COIs 
and begins to monitor for COI events. The pilot is not 
likely to see more than 5 alerts on the whole flight, well 
within his processing capacity. If each alert is 
accompanied by 100 data values (to update the display), 
the 5 expected alerts present about 100,000 times less data 
than in the pull or simple push environment. These 
differences are significant and are very attractive to the 
pilot. While we don’t know exactly how this reduction in 
workload translates into mission outcomes, we can be sure 
that the pilot won’t be glutted, will notice the events, and 
will have sufficient attention resources to deal with them. 
Further, we have reduced bit flows by 99.999%, freeing up 
critical communication resources for other purposes.  
 
When you improve bit flows by five orders of magnitude, 
you will change the organization in qualitative ways that 
will need to be supported by an appropriate system 
architecture. Throughout biological and man-made 
systems, each order of magnitude (10 X) change tends to 
induce both structural and qualitative changes. The 
benefits of VIRT may not always be as great as five orders 
of magnitude, but they will be huge. In a recent thesis, 
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using a discrete event simulation, my student LCDR Ray 
Acevedo [10] estimated a 200-fold improvement in 
bandwidth utilization when VIRT is employed within a 
Navy air tracking system called Cooperative Engagement 
Capability (CEC). The two orders of magnitude 
improvement means that considerably less 
communications bandwidth is required to convey 









concept of clearly specified semantics is ontology (see 
http://www.w3.org/2001/sw/). When users agree on what 
terms they use and what they mean, they have formulated 
such an ontology. 
 
So, users will refer to information categories and express 
COIs using the terms of an ontology. An ontology for pilot 
weather might include terms such as icing, thunderstorms, 
dust storms, icing, visibility, and ceiling. An ontology for 
pilot avoidance of air defenses might include terms such as 
probability of detection, safe distance to avoid detection, 
and SAMs.  Users will be able to find relevant information 
among many possible sources, because each source will 
annotate its data with meta-data describing the categories 
of information included. In short, users can find relevant 
information by seeking sources that advertise available 
data with terms matching those in the users’ ontology.  
 
 
Such information advertising might be done in various 
ways. The DoD data-sharing directive [2] takes an initial 
step by requiring all suppliers of information to annotate 
data with XML tags associated with an XML schema that 
defines the vocabulary or types. Beyond this, many groups 
throughout DoD and the broader Federal Government have 
formed communities of interest to work out common 
vocabularies and XML schemas (cf.  
http://it.ojp.gov/jxdm/, http://web-services.gov/ )/  spend processing important information.  
 
Figure 2. Comparing VIRT with UDOP and COP [9]. 
In a VIRT system, users define and refine expected
conditions of interest (COI), while providers search for 
critical deltas and serve the users high value per bit.    
These advantages are too big to ignore, yet there are many 
reasons to believe current DoD approaches won’t attain 
them without some change in direction. In the next section, 
we consider the implicit approach being taken in 
GIG/NCES development and the risks entailed. That will 
lead ultimately to suggestions about how we can attain far 
greater results with lower risk. 
 
MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR CHALLENGE 
 
The US DoD is implementing the Global Information Grid 
as a way of providing integrated information and 
information processing services throughout the military. 
The architectural approach aims to leverage Internet and 
web service technology, using a Services Oriented 
Architecture (SOA). The foundation services are called 
Net-Centric Enterprise Services, or NCES (see 
www.disa.mil/main/prodsol/cs_nces.html). The basic 
bjective is to provide the infrastructure and tools for 
nformation superiority, where each operator can find and 
ccess all relevant information. 
eyond SOA, this goal of finding and accessing all 
elevant information requires that suppliers and consumers 
f information share some vocabulary and semantics. In 
he semantic web community, the term used to describe the 
 
In the business world, where similar efforts have been 
organized, such as for library resources (the Dublin Core, 
see http://dublincore.org/) and mortgage transactions 
(MISMO, see http://xml.coverpages.org/mbaaXML.html), 
efforts to build useful solutions take a decade or more. 
Practical ontologies result only when operators (end users 
of data) have their needs addressed. This requires 
considering the transactions or processes that will operate 
upon the information, because the value of information is 
determined by its ability to be used quickly, easily, and 
beneficially. Because information ontologies are not easy 
to create, failing to consider carefully how processes 
employ them to accomplish important transactions will 
squander time and money.  
 
Our concern with current approaches to semantic mark-up 
and the development of information schemas arises from 
the failure to focus clearly on information integration in 
the context of processes that deliver VIRT to operators. 
Just because information is accessible and findable does 
not mean it’s valuable. In fact, most mark-ups are useless 
for finding and delivering valuable and timely information. 
While a community of suppliers, such as weather 
forecasters or air defense trackers, might develop a schema 
on its own, there’s little reason to believe their semantics 
will prove suitable for operators or VIRT agents. 
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There are several reasons why supplier-oriented 
communities of interest won’t likely give us the semantics 
and ontologies operators need. 
¾ Suppliers don’t know what problems their users 
are trying to solve or how they solve them. 
¾ Suppliers don’t use the same vocabulary or actual 
concepts as operators do. 
¾ Operators’ objectives, missions, and processes are 
evolving faster than supplier community efforts to 
standardize ontologies. 
So, being brutally frank, we could easily spend a decade or 
more on efforts to standardize information ontologies 
before even beginning to evaluate the putative benefits of 
modern GIG/NCES capabilities to deliver VIRT. At that 
time, we’d discover that operator COIs are the foundation 
for specifying value and that COIs and vocabularies vary 
among different missions, echelons, and roles. So we’d 
find that we didn’t have the required ontologies, couldn’t 
specify operator COIs, and couldn’t implement VIRT. In 
short, after a long infrastructure development, we’d realize 
we hadn’t even started to deliver valued information.  
 
I expect we could spend billions of dollars and a decade or 
more, before we confronted the fundamental question:  
What information needs to be delivered to each operator, 
in a specific context, to improve the operator’s outcome?” 
Rather than predictably proceeding into such a failure, we 
ought to consider if there’s a better, lower-risk approach. 
That’s the subject of the next and final section. 
 
CONCLUSION: A CHANGE OF DIRECTION 
 
We can probably all agree on a few important points. 
Timely valuable information can improve decisions and 
outcomes. Information is potentially valuable if it could 
improve outcomes, but to realize that potential the 
intended beneficiary has to receive it, attend to it, consider 
it and act upon it in time. In situations where human 
processing capacity is limited, where data glut is possible, 
and where communication bandwidth is limited, we must 
give priority to high-value bits. The only way to do this is 
to know which bits would materially affect the receiver. 
This requires understanding the operator’s current state—
the goals, the assumptions, the beliefs—so that 
contradictory events can be detected and quickly 
conveyed. In short, VIRT directly addresses the needs.  
 
VIRT requires a focus on operators in the context of 
missions, because plan assumptions readily reveal what 
conditions of interest must be monitored. These COIs, in 
turn, reveal what semantic categories are required, and this 
reveals the operator’s ontology.  
 
VIRT suggests and makes possible an incremental and 
evolutionary approach to information superiority. We can 
implement VIRT for a small number of operations at a 
time, covering the most important COIs first. This leads us 
to develop the vocabularies and ontologies incrementally. 
In each mission, we can deliver increasing value in 
proportion to the number of COIs monitored. Over time, 
we can extend the ontologies, COIs and missions. In short, 
we can implement incrementally and reap benefits 
incrementally. Moreover, we can recognize and address 
the essential evolutionary requirements from the outset, 
creating a process and technology base that can continually 
improve its coverage of missions, ontologies and COIs. In 
that way, we will achieve orders of magnitude better 
results with substantially lower costs, while realizing the 
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